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## MEMORANDUM

INFORMATION

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE

February 28, 1973

*Noted by HAK*

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER

FROM:  Army Review Completed JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE *W.H. for*SUBJECT: Communist Intentions During the Post-Cease-  
fire Period

MORI/CDF per C03223156

The CIA Station Chief in Saigon has forwarded his field assessment of Communist intentions during the post-ceasefire period. In summary, the assessment indicates that while the Communists are currently placing their main reliance on political struggle, [redacted] the pattern of current Communist plans indicate that Hanoi is preserving and expanding its military options in preparation for a possible return to the use of military force should political developments fall short of Communist objectives.

25X1

The assessment points to the following signs that no end to Communist military pressure is in sight:

25X1

-- COSVN Resolution # 2 is reported [redacted] as making clear that Hanoi is preparing to revert to main force warfare if the political struggle does not produce a settlement on its terms.

-- Cadres of the VC 5th Division have been instructed to expand "liberated areas" without awaiting the results of the political struggle. Other cadre have been instructed to observe the agreement outwardly but to violate it secretly.

25X1 -- [redacted] as many as 16,000 NVA reinforcements, including many infantry troops, are now in the pipeline heading south.

-- In a pattern parallelling the southward move of anti-aircraft artillery in late 1971/early 1972, the NVA have established SA-2 SAM installations in Quang Tri Province, thus gaining a security shield for further offensive operations.

-- The NVA is engaged in a major logistics push. Supplies are reported to be pouring into the A Shau Valley west of Hue and Laos truck movements are reported to be over 400 per week.

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

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-- Communist designation of Duc Co and Xa Mat as entry points strengthen the prospect that they will continue to use Cambodia and Laos as logistics bases.

The field appraisal concludes that these Communist steps may well be the opening slices in the traditional Communist "salami" campaign designed to maintain and strengthen Hanoi's military options and that "the extent and severity of the Communist moves will surely increase unless they are challenged promptly and with credibility." The Station Chief's assessment is at Tab A.

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